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Production risk and market access put pressure on agricultural household production and 
food consumption decisions. Improving market access and promoting production diversity 
have been proposed as solutions to better agricultural household nutritional outcomes. 
Particularly with regards to production diversity, the efficacy of these solutions has been 
called into question. We show that the effectiveness of increased production diversity 
translating into improved household nutrition is dependent on levels of market participation 
and access. To demonstrate these results, this paper develops a non-separable agricultural 
household model with multiple agricultural goods for consumption and/or production, 
production risk, and imperfect markets. Households jointly maximize production, 
consumption, and marketing decisions. The model’s results are tested econometrically using 
nationally representative data from Tanzania. The paper contributes to a growing empirical 
literature concerning the relationships between production diversity, market access, and 
dietary diversity. We show that while on average a household needs to grow ten additional 
food groups to consume just one more food group, households not participating in markets 
need to grow just four more food groups to consume one more. This interaction explains 
why the literature typically finds weak correlations between dietary diversity and production 
diversity for typical households. The paper also contributes to the theoretical literature 
surrounding non-separable household models by providing a framework for understanding 
the role of markets and risk for household dietary diversity by developing. Our model 
provides economic theory consistent with existing empirical evidence and helps explain why 
most studies only find a small link between production diversity and dietary diversity. 
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Malnutrition is a significant challenge for the world. In the developing regions of the world, 780 million people are
undernourished (FAO et al., 2018). The majority of undernourished people are smallholder farmers in rural areas
of Africa and Asia (Pinstrup-Andersen, 2007; Sibhatu and Qaim, 2017). Despite the commitment of the Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015 to end hunger, the share of undernourished people in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)
has grown from 17.4% in 2017 to 19.1% in 2019 (FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP, 2020). Studies show that improving dietary
diversity may be a promising strategy to address undernourishment (Arimond et al., 2010; Kant et al., 1993; Popkin
and Slining, 2013; Sibhatu et al., 2015). Smallholder farmers are particularly vulnerable to under-nutrition, as poverty
rates among smallholders are typically much higher than national averages (Rapsomanikis, 2015). For this reason,
many development initiatives introduce new crops and production methods to smallholder farmers to boost their
production diversity and improve their dietary diversity. However, empirical evidence suggests that households need
to grow nine more crops to increase the number of food groups they consume by one (Sibhatu and Qaim, 2018). Vast
differences in smallholder market access and participation may be influencing the (in)effectiveness of production
diversity as a means to improve dietary diversity (Sibhatu et al., 2015).
This study assesses the interaction of smallholders’ production diversity, market access and participation, and di-
etary diversity. We develop a non-separable agricultural household model for multiple crops, involving joint decision
making on consumption, production under risk, and market participation. Traditional models of agricultural house-
holds assume that food and production choices are separable under perfect markets. However, production and food
choices in the context of rural farming households, particularly in developing regions, are non-separable because of
market imperfections. Smallholder farmers usually face implicit and explicit transaction costs because they lack mar-
ket information on prices, buyers, and sellers and can be far away frommarkets (Chamberlin and Jayne, 2013). These
transaction costs can make consumption of on-farm produce for smallholder farmers cheaper than purchasing food
products from the market. In addition, smallholder farmers are exposed to market and production risks with limited
access to financial instruments (e.g. loans and insurance) to mitigate the effects of those risks. Instead, they diversify
their agricultural production to reduce risk exposure and include both food and cash crops in their production mix
(Makate et al., 2016).
Specifically, our model is a variant of the mean-variance portfolio optimization model, taking the non-separable
production and consumption choices of smallholder farmers into account. In the full model, the farming household
is endowed with a fixed amount of land and labor and can produce multiple crops. The household can consume its
own food production, or as a price taker, it can sell and purchase food items at exogenous market prices. However,
both purchasing and selling in the market involve transaction costs (e.g., transportation costs and costs of accessing
market information). The household allocates its endowments to maximize jointly (i) the returns from the production
while trying to minimize joint production risks, and (ii) household welfare from the consumption of food items. The
household’s consumption and production diversity are estimated endogenously by our model for given market trans-
action costs and prices, production risk, and food preferences. Three factors potentially drive production diversity:
production risks, the love of consumption variety, and transaction costs (i.e. market acces).
Consistent with earlier theories (Finkelshtain and Chalfant 1990, Fafchamps 1992), the model predicts that risk
increases production diversification and reduces specialization in the production of the crop with the highest financial
return. This causes a fall in overall income. Moreover, the household prefers producing cash crops (or crops with high
financial returns) to food crops when it is well integrated into markets (as in Omamo, 1998), but it prefers to produce
food crops when transaction costs prohibit easy access to markets.
Our novel findings concern the interaction between market participation, production, and consumption diversity.
We find that the influence of production risks and diversification on dietary diversity depends on the household’s
level of market access. The model shows that increasing market access (via reducing transaction costs) improves
dietary diversity, allowing the household to specialize in producing (cash) crops with the highest (financial) returns.
With those returns, the household can purchase and consume a diversified basket of food products from the market.
When the household’s level of market access is above a certain threshold, production diversity hinders consumption
diversity. Increases in production risks incentivize the household to diversify their production to mitigate risk, causing
a reduction in the returns from agriculture and consequently, dietary diversity. In contrast, production diversification
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positively contribute to the dietary diversity of a household with limited access to markets (under a given threshold
of market access). Because of the household’s love of variety, the household diversifies their production and grows
multiple crops, whichwill primarily be consumed at home. The household aims to satisfy their preference for a diverse
diet through a diverse production mix. However, growing more crops does not necessarily increase dietary diversity
because it matters which crops are being grown, not just how many.
Finally, we test the predictions of the model through regression analysis. For this purpose, we use the nationally
representative LSMS data for Tanzania in 2013. Rural Tanzania is a suitable and relevant context to test the predictions
of the model, as nearly 68% of Tanzanian households work in the agricultural sector (FAO et al., 2018). Many of these
smallholder farmers’ diets are susceptible to climate shocks. Despite improvements over the last two decades, Global
Hunger Index (GHI) reports that Tanzania has a serious hunger problem and ranks as one of the least food secure
countries in the world, scoring 95th out of 117 countries in 2019 (Global Hunger Index, 2019).
In our regression analysis, we use the presence of village markets to measure market access, and we use past
production shocks to proxy production risks. The results from the analysis show that increased production diversity
is positively correlated with past production shocks and negatively correlated with the presence of markets, confirm-
ing our theoretical predictions. Further, we test whether market participation/access and production diversity are
correlated with dietary diversity and anthropometric measures. Our findings give evidence to the theoretical model
by showing that both market participation and production diversity are positively and significantly correlated with
dietary diversity. Market participation plays a small mediating role in the correlation of production diversity with
dietary diversity – production diversity is positively and significantly correlated with dietary diversity at low levels
market participation, but has zero correlation at higher levels. The results do not hold for anthropometric outcomes,
as in Chegere and Stage (2020).
Our study provides a consistent theoretical framework for the extensive empirical literature surrounding produc-
tion diversity, market access, and household nutrition of smallholder farmers. The study also gives novel insights
to the interaction between these factors. It also provides a clear set of policy implications on rural development and
nutrition. Our findings show that improvements in market access of smallholder farmers while reducing their produc-
tion risks enhances household nutrition. These suggest that improvements in themarket participation of smallholders
must be supported while introducing agricultural methods reducing production risk (e.g., new varieties and produc-
tion methods). Their contribution depends on the market access, food choice, and risk exposure of smallholders. To
this end, before introducing improved varieties or new crops, development practitioners should follow a participatory
approach that involves smallholder households to understand their risks, food choices, market access challenges.
Related literature: Our study contributes to two strands of literature. First, we contribute to the agriculture house-
hold modeling literature. There is an extensive literature on agricultural household models that assess the responses
of household supply and demand to changes in food prices (Taylor and Adelman, 2003). The majority of those mod-
els are so-called separable household models where households decide on production and consumption separately.
The assumption of perfect markets, which allows for separable optimization, makes those models relatively easy to
implement and find analytical results. However, still today, large portions of agricultural households in rural areas of
developing countries are both consumers and producers of food. For this reason, several non-separable models have
been developed to analyze smallholder farmer behaviour. Like their separable predecessors, these models address a
variety of issues, particularly market access’s role in crop diversification. For instance, Omamo (1998) shows that in
the absence of risk, transaction costs explain the low-levels of specialization in agricultural production as a rational
outcome. He suggests that in the case of two goods - a food crop and a cash crop - farmers with high transaction
costs tend to inter-crop food and cash crops more, while farmers with low transaction cost specialize in the cash crop.
de Janvry et al. (1991) introduced market imperfections (via transaction costs) for food and labour markets to analyze
non-separable production decisions. Fafchamps (1992) uses a two-crop non-separable model to analyze the relation-
ship between market access, risk, and crop allocations. The paper shows that small farms are food-crop oriented
and large farms are cash crop oriented - a common observation in developing countries. Goetz (1992) illustrates a
model whereby the households participate in markets based on fixed transaction costs. Key et al. (2000) extends
this work by looking at the differences between the introduction of per-unit and fixed transaction costs on household
market participation and supply response and by simultaneously solving the production, consumption, and market
participation decisions.
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The non-separable householdmodels that arementioned above cannot analyze the cases ofmany production and
consumption goods, instead opting for two-good models. This omission makes it difficult to study household dietary
diversity - a key component of household nutrition. This paper fills that gap in agricultural households modeling by
introducing a non-separable household model with multiple goods produced under risk. For this purpose, we use
the mean-variance framework that was originally proposed by Markowitz (1952) in the context of investors’ portfolio
allocation decisions in financial markets. The mean-variance approach and variants of it have been applied to farm
planning in numerous studies (Collins 1988; Tauer 1983; Watts et al. 1984; Coyle 1992; Coyle 1999). Tzouvelekas
(2011) uses a mean-variance approach with non-separability in labor markets. It tests the results for British farmers,
in light of EU pricing policy support. In this study, we use the mean-variance approach with non-separable agricul-
tural households models with imperfections in food markets in developing countries, for (to our knowledge) the first
time. While our model is focused on the relationships between risk, market access, production and consumption
diversification, it is also generalizable enough to potentially add other components.
Second, this relates to the empirical literature investigating the relationship between production diversity, market
access, and household nutrition in developing countries. We contribute a theoretical framework for the empirical
literature and empirically test the role of the interaction between production diversity and market access in deter-
mining dietary diversity. Several papers have found increases in consumption diversity associated with increases in
production diversity. In Zimbabwe, crop diversification increased the dietary diversity of children and women during
a nutrition education intervention (Murendo et al., 2018). Similar results are found in Malawi using nationally rep-
resentative data, where crop and livestock diversification were associated with higher consumption diversity (Jones
et al., 2014). While much of the research regarding the relationship between production diversity and nutrition is in
Sub-Saharan Africa, these relationships have been observed in other regions, such as Bolivia (Jones, 2015) and India
(Kumar et al., 2016). Despite the evidence that production diversity can improve household nutrition, the efficiency
of production diversity as a lever to improve nutritional outcomes has been brought into question. In a meta-analysis
of 45 studies in 26 countries analyzing this relationship, Sibhatu and Qaim (2018) find that the mean marginal effect
of production diversity on household dietary diversity is quite low. In SSA, the review concludes that a household
would need to cultivate nine additional crops just to increase consumption diversity by one food group (Sibhatu and
Qaim, 2018).
Several other studies empirically analyse the effect of market access on household diversity. For instance, in a
panel study in northern Ethiopia, being located closer to markets is associated with higher overall dietary diversity
for children (Abay and Hirvonen, 2017). In Kenya, access to selling produce to supermarkets is found to improve
household nutrition (Chege et al., 2015). Evidence even points towards market access being a more critical factor
in improving household nutrition than production diversity in Malawi (Koppmair et al., 2017). Finally, cash income
from produce is associated with higher dietary diversity and micro-nutrient consumption than production diversity
in Uganda, Indonesia, and Kenya (Sibhatu and Qaim, 2016). Our theoretical model contributes to this literature by
explaining howmarket access mediates the effect of product diversification on household dietary diversity by empha-
sizing the importance of the interaction betweenmarket access and production, and providing a consistent theoretical
framework for existing empirical analysis.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines the theoretical model and its implications. Section 3
introduces the econometric methods for testing the production outcomes of the model. Section 4 discusses the data
used in the econometric approach, and Section 5 shows the results of the econometric analysis. We conclude the
paper with a brief discussion on the findings. All proofs are shown in the appendices.
2 Theoretical Model
The proposed model is a non-separable household model (i.e. households maximize consumption, production, and
market participation simultaneously) with N agricultural goods. The goods can either be produced and consumed
at home or produced and sold on the market in exchange for other agricultural goods. On the production side, the
householdmaximizes productionwhileminimizing production risk according to amulti-goodmean-variance function.
On the consumption side, householdsmaximize utility according tomulti-good additive log utility function. Themulti-
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good approach allows for the extrapolation of dietary diversity scores and can show how dietary diversity is related
to market access and production risk (e.g. climate variability).
To simplify themodel and focus on the linkages of consumption diversity and production diversity with production
risk and market access, several assumptions are made. Households are price-takers in both supply and demand of
agricultural goods. As consumers, households have a love of variety of goods. Further, households are risk-averse,
and their production carries risk (in the form of climatic variation). Households are assumed to have no livestock
holdings, cannot engage in off-farm labor, and land and labor costs are zero. These assumptions can be relaxed, but
this is beyond the scope of this research.
This section first introduces the model’s hypotheses, followed by a presentation of the model framework on both
the consumption and production sides. The model framework culminates in a derivation of the household’s value
function. Then, the case of perfect markets in a risk-less setting is analyzed to understand the simplest case of the
model. The next two sub-sections relax the assumption of a risk-free environment and of perfect markets, respec-
tively. These specific cases of the model uncover the effects of production risk and market access on household
production decisions and on household dietary diversity.
2.1 Hypotheses
The theoretical model is intended to explain the economic theory behind the empirical evidence linking production
diversity, market access, and dietary diversity. Three main propositions are put forward in examining these relation-
ships:
Proposition 1 Market access leads to greater specialization in production.
Proposition 2 Production risk leads to higher production diversity.
Proposition 3 Higher production diversity leads to higher dietary diversity if market access is low (and vice versa).
Proposition 4 Higher market access leads to higher dietary diversity through increased income.
We show that these four propositions hold using specific cases of a non-separable agricultural household model
presented below.
2.2 Model Setup
Let there be a utility-maximizing agricultural household that both produces and consumes food crops during one
period1 The household can consume and produce up toN different crops. Utility is gained through the consumption
of crops and takes an additive log-utility functional form with decreasing marginal returns to each individual crop




wi ln(ci + 1) (1)
wherewi is a preference parameter for good i and ci is the consumption quantity of good i. Adding the constant
1 to consumption allows for zero consumption and ensures only positive consumption values can lead to positive
1By ’food’ crops, we mean any agricultural good that can be consumed, including traditional cash crops like tea and coffee.
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utility2. The household can consume any good i through two different channels – by producing and selling crops
on the market and using the resulting income to purchase and consume crop i (”market consumption”) or through
producing crop i at home and consuming the resulting home-production (”home consumption”). Consumption for






where cmi is market consumption and c
h
i is home consumption. We assume the household does not differentiate
between consumption from the market and consumption from home production (i.e. both types of consumption
yield equivalent amounts of utility). In both consumption channels, production of crops is required whether to sell on
the market for income in the case of market consumption or to consume at home in the case of home consumption.
Households are endowed with a productive asset and can allocate a proportion, 0  si  1, of that productive asset
to any good i of theN goods that can possibly be produced. This productive asset can be thought of as land and/or
labor, and it may be a combination inputs. Further, these productive inputs are free3 (i.e. there are no land or labor
costs in the model). Production carries risk and is assumed to be log-normally distributed. Production, qi, for any
good i is given by:
qi = si i✏i, ✏i ⇠ N (1, 2i ) (3)
where qi is the quantity of good i produced,  i is a productivity parameter, and ✏i is the risk term following a
log-normal distribution with mean 1 and variance  i. We assume all production risks are uncorrelated. This is a
simplifying assumption and does not affect the mechanisms which we are trying to demonstrate In Appendix A, we
show that the formulation in Equation 3 is compatible with a Cobb-Douglas production function for each crop i if all
crops have identical output elasticities for land and labor.
Under production risk, households are risk averse in their production decisions and choose to allocate their re-
sources using a mean-variance approach that simultaneously maximises production and minimizes production vari-





2 8 i 2 N (4)
where a is a non-negative constant determining the variance’s contribution to utility. We restrict analysis to the
domain in which 0  qi < 1a because this is the domain on which Equation 4 is monotonically increasing. Beyond this
point, expected quantity of good i decreases with more productive resources allocated to it (a common assumption
when using quadratic utility functions).
Households choose how to allocate their productive resources to maximize their utility. For each crop i, they can
allocate resources to production for sale on themarket, smi , or production for home consumption s
h
i . If the household




(pi   ti)E[qi] (5)
2This can be seen through the basic properties of the natural log function. ln(x) is undefined when x = 0. Then, log utility is undefined for
zero consumption. In contrast, ln(x+1) = 0when x = 0, indicating that utility is zero at zero consumption. The later is better suited in scenarios
when zero consumption of an individual good is common. Since, ln(x) is monotonically increasing and has global diminishing marginal returns,
and ln(x+ 1) is defined for every values of x 2  (1,1), then ln(x) and ln(x+ 1) have the same proprieties for the range [0,1), the possible
range of consumption values.
3This is a simplifying assumption, but does not affect the relationship we aremost interested in analyzing – the relationship between production
risk, market access, and consumption diversity.
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where pi is the market unit price for good i and ti is the transaction cost for selling a unit of good i on the market.
Equation 5 serves as the budget constraints for market purchases as well, and combining Equation 4 and Equation 5,
















where the purchase price for good i on the market is the market price, pi, plus the per unit transaction cost ti.
Home consumption does not need to be purchased, but it is constrained by home production. The household cannot
consume more of a crop from home production than it produces for home consumption. Assuming there are no
post-harvest losses, the home consumption is constrained by:









i 8 i 2 N (7)





wi ln(E[cmi ] + E[c
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The maximization problem in Equation 8 is specified in terms of both c terms (in the utility function) and s terms
(in the constraints). The problem states that households maximize their utility from consumingN goods (from home
and/or the market) subject to their market consumption of all goods being constrained by their income and their
home consumption of any being constrained by the production of that good for home consumption. To simplify
the problem and specify it only in terms of s terms, the utility function can be expressed as an indirect utility func-
tion (which shows the maximum attainable utility given prices and income) via the principle of duality in optimization
problems. Appendix B shows how each cmi term can bewritten in terms of prices and income and the utilitymaximiza-
tion problem can be converted into the value function maximization problem in Equation 9 whereby the household
only chooses s values to maximize utility, and optimal c values are obtained ex-post. In the resulting value function
































where the constraint ensures that the proportion of productive resources allocated to all crops (for home and
market production) is equal to one (i.e. the household cannot allocate more resources than it has).
Equation 9 describes the entire model. The household chooses production levels and marketing decisions of N
goods to maximize their additive log utility of consumption ofN goods either at home or from the market. The two
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terms in brackets are the contributions to utility of consumption from the market place and from home production,
respectively, for each good i. The constraint on Equation 9 indicates that the household can only use their endowment
of productive inputs for production.
Market consumption is defined by the first term in brackets in Equation 9. There are two components to total
market consumption. The first is household income from producing and selling goods on the market:
PN
j=1(pj  
tj)(smj E[ j ]  a2sjE[ j ]
2+ 2j ). This follows directly from the income constraint in Equation 8. The second term is the




. Income and the relative preference/price
parameter a multiplied together to give this total consumption of a good i from the market place. Intuitively, this
shows that households choose their consumption behavior in markets by spending all of their income while consum-
ing more of goods they prefer, consuming less of expensive goods, and balancing these two attributes. Further, The
household operates under imperfect markets, whereby it pays a per-unit transaction cost of t to participate in both
production and consumption markets.
The second term in brackets is the consumption from home production, which follows directly from the second
constraint in Equation 8. Householdsmust consume fromhome production only the total food they produce for home
consumption. The final term inside the natural log function is the constant, 1, which ensures that zero consumption
of any good is possible and leads to zero utility.
The value function is monotonically increasing on the interval of qh,mi 2 [0, 1a ], the range which we defined the
production function above. Using Equation 9, the next subsections focus on specific cases of this model which can
show two motivations for production diversity and their differential effects on consumption diversity.
2.3 The Base Case: Perfect Market without Production Risk
In the ”base case” of the model, the household engages in perfect markets without risk. Understanding how the
household behaves under these assumptions, sets the comparison for the model with imperfect markets and/or risk.
These comparisons will show how risk affects household outcomes (Propositions 2 and 3), and how market access
affects household outcomes (Propositions 1 and 4).
In the case of perfect output markets, there are no transaction costs (ti = 0 8 i), and as a result, households can
seamlessly sell their production on the market and exchange it for consumption goods. Households do not engage
in home production in this case since home production is equivalent to selling a unit of good i on the market and
buying it back at the same price, pi. The scenario leads to a separable model, whereby households can maximize
their income and consumption separately. Since the value function represents the maximized utility for a given level
of income and prices, at this stage, the household only needs to maximize its income to maximize the value function.
In the case, we also assume that there is no production risk ( i = 0 8 i). No production risk also implies that
the production function is linear instead of quadratic, and expected production simplifies to: E[qi] = qi. Combining





















Since ln(.) is monotonically increasing on the domain specified for the value function, the function is maximized
by maximizing the argument of Equation 10. Without production risk, the household chooses to invest in the highest
returning productive activity, determined by the term pj j , which maximizes utility.
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Proposition 1: Market access leads to greater specialization in production.
(
argmaxE[V ] = s⇤k = 1
s
⇤
i = 0 8 i 6= k
(11)
where good k is the good that has the highest return, pk k and yields the highest utility after taking into account
fixed costs. Consumption can be calculated ex-post and becomes the optimal consumption values found in Appendix
B. From these optimal consumption values, it is easy to see how dietary diversity improves with income. Let dietary







where C is total consumption. The HHI measures the level of concentration in a diet. A lower HHI indicates a
less concentrated diet (or a more diverse diet) while a higher HHI indicates a more concentrated (less diverse) diet.
In Appendix C, we show that the comparative static of HHI with respect to income is negative, indicating that dietary




Therefore, increasing dietary diversity for the household with perfect market access and no risk requires only
increasing household income. Production diversity away from the most profitable crop will reduce income and con-
sequently, reduce dietary diversity.
2.4 Perfect Markets with Production Risk
Tounderstandwhy risk increases productiondiversity (Proposition2), the assumptionof risk-less production is dropped,

























Since there are perfect markets, the household can optimize consumption and production separately, and the
production choices that maximize income will also maximize utility from consumption. The household solves:
PN
















Proposition 2: Production risk leads to higher production diversity.
This is the standard mean-variance problem and it leads to the well-known optimal solution:
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In the optimal solution, the household diversifies to reduce exposure to risk. While risk is reduced, the income is
necessarily lower than in the risk-less case because the household has diversified away from producing only the most
profitable good in exchange for producing less profitable crops (and higher return is associated with higher risk). As in
the case of perfect markets and no risk, the optimal consumption parameters fall directly from the optimal solution.
However, since income is lower in the case involving risk than no risk, and the comparative static of HHI with respect
to income is negative (see Equation 13) then diversification caused by risk also has a negative effect on HHI.
Proposition 3 (Part 1): Higher production diversity leads to lower dietary diversity if the market access is high.
HHIrisk > HHIno risk (19)
Equation 19 shows part of Proposition 4. Agricultural households with high market access who diversify produc-
tion to mitigate risk have lower dietary diversity. This means that production diversity is not necessarily associated
with higher consumption diversity and can depend on the level of market access. The next sub-sections show the role
of production diversity when market access is low.
2.5 Imperfect Markets without Production Risk
To show the other side of Proposition 3, imperfect markets are introduced (i.e. transaction costs are present). For
simplicity of demonstration, let each transaction cost be ti = pi, such that the household cannot earn any income






















8 i 2 N (21)
In the optimal solution, the household’s production decisions depend only on their consumption preferences w
and productivity parameters  . Therefore, a second source of production diversification is market access – when a
household loses market access, then they diversify their production mix in order to meet their demand for different
types of food consumption, and they do it in a way that is aligned with their consumption preferences and productive
capacity. This is in contrast to the case where the household has perfect market access and no risk, as this household
specializes its production completely in the most profitable crop. The result in Equation 21 shows the second source
of production diversification: lack of output market access.
Proposition 3 (Part 2): Higher production diversity leads to higher dietary diversity if the market access is low.
It is trivial to show that a decrease in production HHI is equivalent to a decrease in consumption HHI:
HHIproduction = HHIconsumption if ti = pi 8 i (22)
The effects of autarky on dietary diversity are negative. This result can be logically extended to less extreme cases
of imperfect markets, such that 0 < ti < pi. When transaction costs are 0, then the there are perfect markets,
and when they are equal to pi, then the household operates in autarky for a given good, i. In the ”in between” cases,
ti ! pi is equivalent to a decrease price and results in a decrease in income (this trivially follows from the definition
of income in Equation 5) . Further, this relationship is linear by definition. Appendix C shows that a loss in income is
associated with a loss in dietary diversity. Therefore, an increase in transaction costs (or a decrease in market access)
is also associated with a decrease in dietary diversity. This results in Proposition 4:
Proposition 4: Higher market access leads to higher dietary diversity despite being associated with lower produc-
tion diversification
HHIMarket Access < HHINo Market Access (23)
The result in Equation explains why the empirical literature has found that households with higher market access
have higher dietary diversity. They have higher incomes and can purchase a diverse range of foods from the markets.
However, these households have lower production diversity than households without market access. This shows that
market access is a mediating factor for the effect of production diversity (from production risk) on dietary diversity.
Additionally, the difference between the range of goods offered on the market may also mean that the household
operating in autarky has lower dietary diversity than the household operating in perfect markets. Let there by N
crops that are able to be produced -  i > 0 8 i 2 N and let there by N + M foods that can be purchased on the
market. The difference in the goods able to be produced and able to be purchased can occur for a myriad of reasons,
e.g. on-farm limitations to the range of crops that can be produced and imports of foods grown in different climates




The empirical analysis tests whether the propositions put forth in Section 2.1 hold among smallholder farmers in rural
Tanzania. To better understand how the empirical analysis links with the model’s propositions, the propositions can
be re-stated using empirical terminology. The terminology in the propositions below draws on the variables used in
the analysis (Section 4). The propositions to be tested empirically are:
Proposition 1 Market participation and/or living in a village with market is negatively correlated with production
diversity.
Proposition 2 Households experiencing negative production shocks in the past ten years have higher production di-
versity than households not experiencing production shocks.
Proposition 3 Production diversity is positively correlated with dietary diversity for households with low market par-
ticipation and negatively correlated with dietary diversity for households with higher market participation (or with
village markets).
Corollary to Proposition 3 Overall, production diversity is positively correlated with dietary diversity in rural Tanza-
nian households because market participation is low4.
Proposition 4 Market participation and/or living in a village with market is positively correlated with higher dietary
diversity.
3.1 The Production Side: Testing Propositions 1 and 2
Section 2 shows that production diversity can be driven by market access and risk exposure.
To test Propositions 1 and 2, we follow an empirical strategy similar to Asante et al. (2018). The following regres-
sion model is estimated:
pdi =  0 +  1 j +  2shocki +  3marketi +  Xi + ✏i (24)
where pdi is a production diversity outcome (discussed in Section 4), shocki is an indicator of whether the house-
hold experienced a negative production shock in the past ten years (a proxy for perceived risk), marketi is the market
participation or access variable, Xi is a vector of household-level controls, ↵j is a district fixed effects term,  0 is a
constant, and ✏i is the error term.
Standard errors in the models which use count variables (e.g. Agricultural Diversity Score) as dependent variables
are estimated assuming a Poisson distribution. The models with HHI (i.e. Simpson’s Index) are estimated with a GLM
model using a logistic functional link and binomial distribution of the outcome variable, as all values of Simpson’s
Index fall between 0 and 1. Marginal effects are calculated and reported in each model.
The main independent variables of interest are shocki and marketi, whose coefficients,  2 and  3 respectively,
indicate whether Propositions 1 and 2 hold.
4This corollary is added becausewe test for the overall correlation of production diversity with dietary diversity in addition to correlations based
on market participation, in line with previous studies
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3.2 The Consumption-Side: Testing Propositions 3 and 4
To test Proposition 4 and the Corollary to Proposition 3, we use models that are commonly run in the empirical liter-
ature surrounding production diversity, market access, and dietary diversity (Sibhatu and Qaim 2016, Jones (2017a),
Jones 2017b, Koppmair et al. 2017). The model is given by:
ddi =  1pdi +  2marketi +  Xi + ↵j +monthi + ✏i (25)
where ddi is a household measure of dietary diversity (either HDDS or HHI), pdi is a measure of crop diversity
(Agricultural Diversity Score or Simpson’s Index), marketi is a measure for market participation or market access,Xi
is a vector of control variables, ↵j is the distric fixed effects, and monthi is a fixed effects variable for the month the
survey was conducted (included because of seasonal variation in dietary diversity), and ✏i is the error term.
As in the production diversity models, standard errors with models using HDDS as an outcome variable are esti-
mated using an assumed Poisson distribution (as HDDS is a count variable). Standard errors in models with Consump-
tion HHI as an outcome are estimated with GLM with a logistic link and binomial distribution. Marginal effects are
reported in each of the specifications.
To test the Corollary to Proposition 3, an interaction term between production diversity and market access/par-
ticipation is added to Equation . The model becomes:
ddi =  1pdi +  2marketi +  3pdi ⇥marketi +  Xi + ↵j +monthi + ✏i (26)
The coefficient  3 of the interaction term, pdi⇥marketi indicates whether market participation has amoderating
or exacerbating influence on the relationship between production diversity and dietary diversity. A negative  3 indi-
cates that crop diversity is less important for households with high access/participation in markets, while a positive
 3 indicates that crop diversity is more important for households with high market access/participation.
Due to well-known issues issues with the interpretation of coefficients for interaction terms in non-linear models
(Shang et al., 2018), we calculate the marginal effects of crop diversity for different levels of market-participation and
create margins plots to graphically understand and interpret the interaction effects (as in the analysis of Equation 26).
4 Data, Variables, and Summary Statistics
4.1 Data Sources
The empirical analysis uses data from the third wave of the Tanzanian National Panel Survey (NPS), which forms part
of theWorld Bank’s Living Standards andMeasurement Studies (LSMS). Tanzania’s National Bureau of Statistics (NPS)
implemented the survey from October 2012 to September 2013. We restrict the analysis to 1,050 rural households
engaging in agriculture and having less than two hectares of land, which is a cutoff for small-scale farmers (Lowder
et al., 2016).
The NPS survey contains instruments regarding household demographics, household characteristics (e.g. income,
assets), household consumption on 59 food items for the seven days prior to the survey, household plot-level agri-
cultural information, and community-level data. We link the household food consumption data with nutrition tables
for Tanzania from the Harvard School of Public Health (Lukmanji et al., 2008). We test the propositions in Section 2.1





Production diversity ismeasured using two commonmeasures of production diversity: the Agricultural Diversity Score
(ADS) and Simpson’s Index of diversity (SI), which is the HHI applied to an agricultural setting. The ADS is a simple
count of the number of food crops grown by the household, according to the same twelve food groups used in the
Household Dietary Diversity Score (HDDS) (see below). The ADS is a useful measure, but is unable to assess the
evennesss’ of production across different crops. The SI captures this evenness and for a household, i, is calculated as
SIi =
PN
j=1 1  s2j , where sj is the area share of cultivation for crop j. SI corresponds directly to the diversification
measures used in Section 2.
On the consumption side, dietary diversity is the main outcome variable of interest. Dietary diversity is measured
in two ways - the HDDS index (Koppmair et al. 2017, (Jones, 2017a), Sibhatu and Qaim 2016) and the HHI for food
consumption (Akerele et al., 2017). These are analogous to the production outcomes. HDDS is a simple count of the
twelve food groups consumed by the household in the past seven days. The consumption HHI is a concentration index
of the different foods consumed by the household. Using the Harvard School of Public Health nutrition tables, we
calculate the total number of calories consumed by the household in the past seven days and the number of calories
coming from each food item. We then calculate the percentage of calories coming from individual food items. The
consumption HHI for household i is given by HHIi =
PN
j=1 1   s2j , where sj is the percentage share of calories
coming from food item j5
As additional analysis presented in Appendix H, we test whether these results translate to children’s anthropo-
metric outcomes. Measures of children’s anthropometric outcomes can be used as an indicator of overall household
nutrition (WFP, 2005). Three anthropometric outcomes for children under five are used to proxy household nutrition.
Wasting is measured by a low weight-for-height z-score (WHZ); stunting is measured by a low height-for-age z-score
(HAZ); being underweight is measured by a low-weight-for-age z-score (WAZ). As in Chegere and Stage (2020), we
create indicator variables for each of these measures. If the z-scores fall below -2 for WHZ, HAZ, or WAZ for any child
in the household then a household is considered to have a stunted, wasted, or underweight child, respectively.
4.2.2 Main Independent Variables
Depending on the econometric model, the main independent variables of interest are producer market participation
and access indicators, the presence of production shocks in the past 10 years, and crop production diversity indicators
(discussed in Section 3).
Market participation is measured by a weighted average of the percent of crops sold, where the weight is the area
of a crop under cultivation6. This measure follows the logic of themaize and non-maizemarket participation variables
used in Koppmair et al. (2017), but combines all crops into one and applies weights based on the area of production
for each crop.
The primary market access indicator is the presence of a daily or weekly markets in a given household’s village.
This measure is chosen because we make the assumption that market access should be positively correlated with
market participation. The presence of a daily or weekly market has the highest positive relationship with market
participation of all the considered market access indicators (see Appendix F).
Production risk is proxied by whether a household experienced a negative production shock (either drought or
pests) in the past ten year. Thismeasure provides a subjective perception of the risk levels of a household’s production
environment.
5The HHI is constructed using food items, not food groups because individual food items within a food group can also have important micro-









Each specification includes a series of household and community-level control variables. Household-level demo-
graphic variables include the household head’s age, sex, an indicator for whether the household head is literate or not,
and household size. These variables are related to the labor endowment available to households in Section 2. In rela-
tion to households’ land endowment, the number of acres devoted to agriculture is included as a control variable. To
control for effects livestock on dietary diversity the number of tropical livestock units is included as a control. Outside
income and wealth effects are controlled for using log annual non-agricultural income, log value of loans received,
log agricultural input value, an indicator for mobile phone ownership, and indicator for use of mobile money. Finally,
we include the survey-month fixed effects to capture seasonal variation in consumption and district fixed effects to
capture geographic variation in both production and consumption.
4.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics for the households considered in the analysis of the 2012/2013 wave of the
NPS. In terms of production diversity, every household cultivates a crop from at least one food group (Agricultural
Diversity Score), with the average household cultivating around 3 food groups and the maximum cultivating seven.
The average production concentration, measured by Simpson’s Index, is 0.51 meaning that most households have
a somewhat diverse crop mix. The average household sells only 19% of their crop production, indicating that most
households are primarily engaged in subsistence agriculture.
The typical household consumed seven food groups (out of twelve possible groups) in the seven days prior to the
survey, but this measure is fairly variable with a standard deviation of almost two food groups. The dietary HHI also
shows that households have fairly diverse diets (more diverse than their production), but there is considerable varia-
tion with some households having a diet concentrated in only one food item. In terms of anthropometric measures,
28% of households have at least one child under five who is stunted, 3% have at least one wasted child, and 10% have
an underweight child. However, only about half of the households have any children under the age of five.
The average household has 5.66 members, and the average household head is 46 years old. 77% of household
heads are men, and 68% of household heads are literate. In terms of household agriculture, the average household
owns about two acres of land7.
Financially, the average household earns 606,649 TZS (⇡ 382 USD using January, 2013 exchange rates). The aver-
age household received 37,480 TZS (⇡ 24 USD) in the past twelve months and has 30,406 (⇡ 19 USD) in outstanding
loans. Households use 97,225 (⇡ 61 USD) in agricultural inputs on average. Finally, 63% of households have mobile
phones, but only 27% have access to mobile money.
7Only households with fewer than 4.95 acres (two hectares) are considered.
15
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
(1)
Mean Standard Deviation Median Minimum Maximum
ADS 3.01 1.39 3.00 1.00 7.00
Simpson’s Index 0.51 0.32 0.50 0.00 1.00
HDDS 7.11 1.91 7.00 0.00 10.00
Dietary HHI 0.34 0.20 0.29 0.00 1.00
Stunting = 1 0.28 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00
Wasting = 1 0.03 0.18 0.00 0.00 1.00
Underweight = 1 0.10 0.30 0.00 0.00 1.00
Presence of Village Market 0.38 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00
% of Crops Sold 18.76 25.85 0.00 0.00 100.00
Production Shock = 1 0.43 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00
HH Head Age 46.34 16.60 44.00 18.00 108.00
HH Head Literate = 1 0.68 0.47 1.00 0.00 1.00
Male HH Head 0.73 0.44 1.00 0.00 1.00
HH Size 4.66 2.34 4.00 1.00 16.00
Total HH Acres 1.98 1.24 2.00 0.10 4.90
Annual Outside Income 606649.58 7724138.65 0.00 0.00 2.40e+08
Agricultural Input Value (Past 12 Months) 97225.02 282138.74 16000.00 0.00 2422800.00
Outstanding Loan Quantity 30406.38 298730.14 0.00 0.00 6200000.00
Remittances Received (Past 12 Months) 37480.76 166852.91 0.00 0.00 3000000.00
HH Tropical Livestock Units 1.40 5.19 0.04 0.00 102.56
Own Mobile Phone 0.55 0.50 1.00 0.00 1.00
Access to Mobile Money 0.21 0.41 0.00 0.00 1.00
Observations 1050
5 Empirical Results
The results show evidence for each of the four propositions put forth in Section 2. First, the production-side propo-
sitions are tested (Propositions 1 and 2), and then the consumption-side results are shown (Propositions 3 and 4 and
the Corollary to Proposition 3).
5.1 The Production-Side: Evidence for Propositions 1 and 2
To test Propositions 1 and 2, Equation 24 is estimated using the ADS and SI as outcomes variables. The results using
perception of production shocks and market participation are presented in Table 2.
Proposition 1: Proposition 1 states that households with higher market access grow fewer crops because of gains
from specialization. The empirical results related to Proposition 2 are presented in Table 2 (usingmarket participation)
and Table 3 (using the presence of village markets).
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Table 2 shows that more market-oriented households grow fewer crops – a 1 percentage point increase in the
percentage of crops old on the market is correlated with a decrease in the number of crops produced by 0.006.
This suggests that a household moving from complete home production to complete market participation (a 100
percentage point increase in the percent of crops sold)would reduce the number of crops they growby 0.6 on average.
The specification without fixed effects and controls gives evidence that Proposition 1 holds. However, the results are
not robust to the inclusion of district and interview month fixed effects (Column 2) and controls (Column 3).
When using Simpson’s Index as an outcome variable, market participation appears to play a statistically significant
role in determining production diversity. The unconditional correlation presented in Table 2 Column 4 shows that
a one percentage point increase in the percentage of crops sold is correlated with 0.0015 point increase in SI. A
household moving from complete autarky to complete market participation (a 100 percentage point increase) would
increase SI by 0.15 points, which is a reduction of production diversity of nearly 0.5 standard deviations. These results
are robust to the inclusion of district and interview month fixed effects (Column 5) and household controls (Column
6). The outcomes is stronger when using Simpson’s Index (which is used in Section 2) as an outcome variable.
Proposition 2: Proposition 2 states that households with higher production risk will diversify their production
as a risk mitigation mechanism. The empirical results for this proposition are presented in Tables 2 and 3 which
show the estimated coefficients from Equation 24. Production risk is proxied using the number of production shocks
experienced in the past ten years. Column 1 of Table 2 shows that households experiencing a production shocks in the
past ten years grow 0.38 cropsmore on average than households not experiencing a shock, conditional only onmarket
participation. This coefficient is attenuated to 0.13 (and statistically significant at the 90% level) when controlling for
district fixed effects and interviewmonth fixed affects (Column 2). The result is not robust to the inclusion of controls
(Column 3).
The correlations between Simpson’s Index and themain independent variables are stronger andmore robust than
for ADS. This could be because the ADSmeasurement is relatively less variable than SI (see Table 1). Column 4 in Table
2 shows that households that experienced production shocks in the past ten years havemore diverse productionmixes
than households not experiencing production shocks (by 0.06 points in SI, or 0.2 standard deviations). This correlation
is attenuated to -0.04 (or 0.12 standard deviations), but robust at the 90% significance level when including fixed
effects, and the result is robust to the inclusion of household controls. These results are also robust to using the
presence of a market in the village as a control instead of the rate of market participation (see Table 3). The evidence
shows that Proposition 2 generally holds, and is strongest evidence is found when considering Simpson’s Index as an
outcome variable (as the theoretical model does) rather than ADS.
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Table 2: Correlates of Production Diversity (Market Participation)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ADS ADS ADS SI SI SI
Production Shock =
1 0.377
⇤⇤⇤ 0.126⇤ 0.0952 -0.0573⇤⇤⇤ -0.0375⇤ -0.0373⇤⇤
(0.0986) (0.0764) (0.0722) (0.0199) (0.0196) (0.0183)
% of Crops Sold -0.00620⇤⇤⇤ -0.00248 -0.00287 0.00148⇤⇤⇤ 0.00101⇤⇤ 0.00164⇤⇤⇤
(0.00206) (0.00175) (0.00175) (0.000413) (0.000399) (0.000392)
HH Head Age 0.0108⇤⇤⇤ -0.000753
(0.00237) (0.000611)
HH Head Literate =
1 0.129 0.0344
(0.0879) (0.0226)
Male HH Head 0.0113 0.00491
(0.0844) (0.0212)
HH Size 0.0479⇤⇤⇤ 0.00155
(0.0124) (0.00414)
Total HH Acres 0.0879⇤⇤⇤ -0.101⇤⇤⇤
(0.0277) (0.00746)
Visited by Agr.
Extension = 1 0.0949 -0.0398
(0.137) (0.0393)







Log Agr. Input Value 0.0672⇤⇤⇤ -0.00574
(0.0256) (0.00667)












District Fixed Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Survey Month Fixed
Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
Columns 1-3 are estimated using a Poisson model
Columns 4-6 are estimated using a GLM model using a logistic functional link and binomial distribution.
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Table 3: Correlates of Production Diversity (Market Access)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ADS ADS ADS SI SI SI
Production Shock =
1 0.417
⇤⇤⇤ 0.135⇤ 0.101 -0.0668⇤⇤⇤ -0.0417⇤⇤ -0.0416⇤⇤
(0.0994) (0.0759) (0.0724) (0.0196) (0.0195) (0.0183)
Village Market = 1 -0.360⇤⇤ -0.137 -0.112 0.0792⇤⇤⇤ 0.0290 0.0399⇤
(0.148) (0.0992) (0.0989) (0.0245) (0.0235) (0.0214)
HH Head Age 0.0112⇤⇤⇤ -0.00106⇤
(0.00235) (0.000608)
HH Head Literate =
1 0.128 0.0342
(0.0884) (0.0223)
Male HH Head = 1 0.00709 0.0102
(0.0850) (0.0214)
HH Size 0.0493⇤⇤⇤ 0.000827
(0.0125) (0.00412)
Total HH Acres 0.0837⇤⇤⇤ -0.0975⇤⇤⇤
(0.0278) (0.00756)
Visited by Agr.
Extension = 1 0.0987 -0.0402
(0.138) (0.0389)







Log Agr. Input Value 0.0612⇤⇤ -0.00278
(0.0258) (0.00665)












District Fixed Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Survey Month Fixed
Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
Columns 1-3 are estimated using a Poisson model
Columns 4-6 are estimated using a GLM model using a logistic functional link and binomial distribution.
5.2 The Consumption-Side: Evidence for Propositions 3 and 4
Proposition 3: Proposition 3 states that production diversity is negatively correlated with dietary diversity in house-
holds with high market access and positively correlated with dietary diversity in households with low market access.
Figure 1 to Figure 4 display the results of the estimation of Equation 26, which tests whether there is a significant inter-
action between market participation/access and production diversity. The results suggest that there is an interaction
term, but there is only weak evidence for this.
19
Figure 1 plots the coefficient of ADS at different levels of market participation. At zero market participation, an
increase in the number of food groups produced is correlated with a 0.25 increase in the number of food groups
consumed (Panel 1). This suggests that a household would need to grow only four more food groups to consume one
more food group8. This coefficient steadily decreases as market participation increases. Households selling 80-100%
of their crops do not realize any statistically significant benefits to dietary from growing one more food group. These
results are robust at the 90% confidence level to the inclusion of district and interview month fixed effects (Panel 2)
and household controls (Panel 3). However, the coefficients are attenuated when including controls and fixed effects.
The full specification suggests, that households with nomarket participation, still need to grow ninemore food groups
to consume just one more food group (a correlation of 0.11), and households selling over 40% of their crops do not
gain any dietary diversity by growing more crops.
The results in Figure 2 showweaker evidence of an interaction effect. The results in Panel 1 suggest that increases
in Simpson’s Index are negatively correlatedwithHDDS for houseoldswith lowmarket participation (0-40%). However,
the results are only robust at the 90% level to the inclusion of district and interviewmonth fixed effects for households
with 20% and 40% market participation (Panels 2 and 3). These dynamics provide weak support for the results in
Figure 1.
When using consumption HHI as an outcome, the results are similar. Figure 3 shows that an increase in ADS is
correlated with an reduction in consumption HHI for households selling 40% or less of their crops. For households
who sell low levels of their production (20%-40%), the results are robust at the 90% level to the inclusion of district and
interviewmonth fixed effects (Panels 2 and 3). The full specification in Panel 3 suggests that a one unit increase in the
number of food groups produced, decreases dietary concentration by around 0.01 point (or 0.05 standard deviations)
for with relatively low levels of market participation (i.e. selling 20% to 40% of their crops).
Figure 4 shows the results using Simpson’s Index as an independent variable and consumption HHI as the depen-
dent variable. The results in Panel 1, which does not include fixed effects or controls, shows that a one unit increase
in Simpson’s Index (a decrease production diversity) is associated with 0.05 increase in consumption HHI (a decrease
in consumption diversity) for households operating in autarky. For households selling more than 0% of their crops,
production diversity does not have a statistically significant relationship with consumption diversity. When including
district and interviewmonth fixed effects (Panel 2) and controls (Panel 3), there are no statistically significant relation-
ships, although the curve of themargins plot slopes in the direction that Proposition 4 predicts. The findings aremuch
weaker when using market access (Appendix G), but this is likely because market access and market participation are
only weakly correlated (Appendix F).
The results do not hold when using Anthropometric measures (results shown in Appendix H). As with dietary
diversity outcomes, the results even appear to be in contrast to the expected outcomes. However, this can be due to
relatively low incidences of malnutrition and half of the households not having children under five (and therefore, by
default, having values of zero for malnutrition).
Figure 1: Correlates of HDDS: Interaction between ADS and ProducerMarket Participation (95% Confidence Intervals)
8The overall sample needs to produce about ten food groups to consume one more. See Table 4
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Figure 2: Correlates of HDDS: Interaction between SI and Producer Market Participation (95% Confidence Intervals)
Figure 3: Correlates of HDDS: Interaction between ADS and ProducerMarket Participation (95% Confidence Intervals)
Figure 4: Correlates of HHI: Interaction between SI and Producer Market Participation (95% Confidence Intervals)
The Corollary to Proposition 3: The Corollary to Proposition 3 states that production diversity should be positively
correlatedwith consumption diversity in the overall sample because the overall sample has lowmarket orientation (an
average of 19% of crops sold on the market). This proposition is tested using Equation 3.2, the results are presented
in Table 4 and Table 5. Table 4 shows that there is robust evidence of Proposition 4a holding when using HDDS as an
outcome variable. Column 1 suggests that if a household cultivates an additional food group, then they will consume
0.16 additional food groups. This correlation is weaker (but still statistically significant) when including district and
interview month fixed effects in Column 2. Column 3 shows that, conditional on household controls and district and
interview month fixed effects, an increase in the production of one food group is correlated with the consumption of
an additional 0.08 food groups. This finding is in line with Sibhatu and Qaim (2018), which finds in a meta-analysis of
the literature that households need to grow 10 additional food groups to consume just one more.
Higher concentration of production is associated with lower HDDS, as seen in Columns 4-6 of Table 4. A one
point increase in Simpson’s Index is correlated with a reduction of 0.006 in the number of food groups consumed.
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Conditional on district and interview month fixed effects, this correlation is only 0.003 (and statistically significant at
the 90% level). While these results are statistically significant and indicative that Proposition 4a holds, they are not
practically significant. If a household has perfect production concentration (an SI of 1), and changes their production
system to perfect diversification (an SI of 0), they will consume 0.33 food groups more on average. In practical terms,
gaining an extra food group of consumption from increasing production diversity can be an extremely costly solution.
Table 5 corroborates these results by showing that increases in the number of food groups grown are significantly
correlated with higher dietary diversity. However, the results are small in absolute terms. Column 1 of 5 shows that
an increase of production diversity by one food group is correlated with a reduction in consumption HHI of 0.014 (or
0.07 standard deviations). The result is robust to the inclusion of district and interviewmonth fixed effects (Column 2)
and household controls (Column 3). The full specification in Column 3 suggests that an increase in production of one
food group reduces consumption concentration by 0.01 points (or 0.05 standard deviations). Columns 4-6 suggest
that when using Simpson’s Index as the explanatory variable related to production diversity, there are no statistically
significant relationships between production diversity and dietary diversity. 5 supports the results in 4 indicating that
there relationships between production and dietary diversity, but they are extremely small in practical terms.
In terms of anthropometric outcomes, the correlations are much weaker. Food production does not appear to
have a statistically significant correlation with the probability of malnutrition in Table 9, although the coefficient of
food production is negative in seven of the nine specifications. Similarly, the coefficient of Simpson’s Index is not
statistically significant for the probability of being underweight and wasting, but it is significantly and negatively cor-
related the probability of stunting.This suggests that less production diversity leads to a lower probability of stunting
(contrary to proposition 4a). However, there are only 35 observations with recorded stunting, so these results should
be interpreted with caution. As with the correlation of market participation and anthropometric measures, this result
does not disprove the proposition, but rather shows that the same factors driving household dietary diversity are not
necessarily driving anthropometric malnutrition outcomes.
Proposition 4: Proposition 4 states that households with higher market access, have higher dietary diversity. Ta-
ble 4 shows the estimates of Equation 3.2 using HDDS as the outcome variable. Across all specifications, there is no
evidence in Table 4 that the percentage of crops sold has a statistically significant correlation with HDDS. However,
when using the consumption HHI as an outcome variable, the percentage of crops sold is significantly and negatively
correlated with consumption HHI (Table 5). These relationships are only observed when including district and in-
terview month fixed effects (Columns 2, 3, 5, and 6). The results in Columns 2 and 5 of Table 5 suggest that a shift
from autarky to complete market participation (a 100 percentage point increase in the percent of crops sold) results
in a 0.057 decrease in consumption HHI. This is equivalent to a 0.29 standard deviation increase in consumption di-
versity. The observed relationship is lower when controlling for household characteristics (Columns 3 and 6), where
the results suggest that a shift from autarky to complete market orientation is correlated with 0.038 decrease in the
consumption HHI. This is equivalent to a 0.19 standard deviation increase in dietary diversity.
The results for Proposition 4 are weak, but there is ample evidence for Proposition 4 in the existing literature, as
is highlighted in a comprehensive review of the literature on this topic (Sibhatu and Qaim, 2018). The weak evidence
could be a result of the low levels of marketing in Tanzania (the weighted average of crops sold is only 19%). The
results are also in-line with other studies from Tanzania – Chegere and Stage (2020) finds no statistically significant
correlation between market orientation and dietary diversity outcomes, but does not use a dietary concentration
index. This could highlight the importance of looking beyond count variables in dietary diversity outcomes and also
analyzing concentration indices.
Further, the results do not hold when using anthropometric measures as outcome variables (presented in Table 9
and Table 10. This is consistent with Chegere and Stage (2020). The results even suggest that an increase in market
participation is associated in an increase probability of a child under five being underweight. However, this result does
not hold for wasting or stunting, and the coefficients are small – a 100 percentage point increase in the percentage
of crops sold is correlated with an 8% increase in the probability of stunting. This result is contrary to the results pre-
sented above, but does not disprove the the theoretical model’s propositions because the theoretical model focuses
on dietary diversity. However, this result may open a discussion of whether dietary diversity is the best measure of
household nutrition or whether anthropometric outcomes represent a better measure for household nutrition.
22
Table 4: Correlates of Household Dietary Diversity Score (Market Participation)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HDDS HDDS HDDS HDDS HDDS HDDS
ADS 0.162⇤⇤⇤ 0.114⇤⇤ 0.0790⇤
(0.0505) (0.0461) (0.0458)
SI -0.568⇤⇤⇤ -0.279 -0.328⇤
(0.213) (0.192) (0.185)
% of Crops Sold -0.00206 0.00226 0.000529 -0.00225 0.00227 0.000775
(0.00257) (0.00250) (0.00249) (0.00260) (0.00249) (0.00249)




Male HH Head 0.0315 0.0306
(0.137) (0.137)
HH Size 0.0322 0.0372
(0.0249) (0.0250)























Own Mobile Phone 0.477⇤⇤⇤ 0.479⇤⇤⇤
(0.140) (0.141)
District Fixed Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Survey Month Fixed
Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
Columns 1-6 are estimated using a Poisson model
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Table 5: Correlates of Consumption HHI (Market Participation)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HHI HHI HHI HHI HHI HHI
ADS -0.0139⇤⇤⇤ -0.00999⇤⇤ -0.0103⇤⇤
(0.00524) (0.00472) (0.00491)
SI 0.0322 0.0174 0.0136
(0.0209) (0.0181) (0.0184)
% of Crops Sold 0.0000551 -0.000570⇤⇤ -0.000387⇤ 0.0000957 -0.000566⇤⇤ -0.000382⇤
(0.000267) (0.000238) (0.000231) (0.000266) (0.000238) (0.000231)




Male HH Head -0.0165 -0.0164
(0.0136) (0.0136)
HH Size 0.0111⇤⇤⇤ 0.0105⇤⇤⇤
(0.00252) (0.00248)






















Own Mobile Phone -0.0400⇤⇤⇤ -0.0400⇤⇤⇤
(0.0135) (0.0135)
District Fixed Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Survey Month Fixed
Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
Columns 1-6 are estimated using a GLM model using a logistic functional link and binomial distribution.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
Nutrition-sensitive agriculture has become a center-piece of many government programs and agricultural interven-
tions in recent decades as the development community aims to meet the SGDs. A central component of many of
these programs is the link between production diversity and dietary diversity. As governments, NGOs, and interna-
tional organizations become more focused on climate change, production diversity among smallholders is taking an
even more central role because of its potential to build resilience to climate change and mitigate smallholder effects
on climate change. Despite production diversity’s assumed linkage with dietary diversity, the empirical evidence is
not promising. Sibhatu and Qaim (2018) finds in a review of empirical studies that a smallholder farmer would need
to grow nine more crops to consume one more food group. These results indicate that practitioners and researchers
alike should rethink the link between dietary diversity and production diversity.
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Our paper provides the first theoretical economicmodel to demonstrate the link between production diversity and
dietary diversity, and we provide empirical evidence validating the predicted outcomes from our model. Much of the
empirical literature has treated smallholder production diversity as exogenous, but smallholders choose which crops
to grow and at what levels. When taking into account why farmers may diversify, the linkage between production
diversity and dietary diversity becomes more clear and we can better see which farmers benefit from production
diversity (in terms of dietary diversity) and which ones do not. Our empirical estimates show that in order to increase
consumption by one food group, the average household needs to produce six more food groups (unconditional on
other factors). However, the households that do not participate in markets only need to grow four more food groups
to consume an additional food group.
From a policy perspective, two major themes come from this research. First,there is not a ”one size fits all” ap-
proach to nutrition-sensitive agriculture. Households with and without access to output markets have very different
requirements to improve their nutrition and respond to different incentives. In order to be effective, agricultural
programs must take this into account or there will continue to be weak linkages between interventions and nutrition
outcomes. In particular, programs seeking to promote new crops or climate smart agriculture (e.g. improved seeds
or improved practices that build resilience to climate change), must carefully think about which crops and practices
to promote for different households in different market access regimes. In other words, programs must be targeted
based on market access to be effective. Second, both the links between production diversity and consumption di-
versity and market participation and consumption diversity are empirically weak, despite being theoretically strong.
This suggests that policymakers should explore other avenues to improve household nutrition, such as improvingmo-
bile infrastructure, road infrastructure, reducing gender gaps in agriculture production, and increasing overall farm
production.
Since the proliferation of non-separable agricultural household models in the 1990s, there has not been much
development in theoretical models of the agricultural household. The literature has become increasingly empirical
for a myriad of reasons. However, non-separable agricultural household models can provide many insights that the
empirical literature may over-look. Further research should continue building on non-separable household models to
explore other issues. Ourmodel does not explore reasons for diversification beyondmarket access and riskmitigation.
For example, these could be joint production or differences in output elasticities. Models looking at thesemotivations
for diversification could also lead to important insights on household nutritional outcomes. Non-separable models
should also be expanded to look at climate changemitigation efforts, adoption of technology, access to finance, access
to labor markets, and various other topics.
Empirically, future research should explore the mediation effect of market access on production and dietary di-
versity. RCTs introducing new crops should also include survey modules on dietary diversity in order to explore the
causal effects of increasing production diversity on dietary diversity. More broadly, future research should focus on
the mechanisms of production diversity and their links to dietary diversity, as production diversity is driven by a num-
ber of factors that may have differential effects on dietary diversity.
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A Combining Cobb-Douglas and Mean-Variance









where a⇤i and l
⇤
i are efficient allocations and LT and AT are the total amounts of labour and land endowed.
We note that since there are no monetary costs associated with land and labor, maximizing revenue and profit
are the same. We also note that theLT term refers to labour that has been allocated to agriculture, excluding labour
allocated to off-farm activities.
The revenue function is given by:
R = p1q1 + p2q2 = p1 1l↵1 a
1 ↵





We can see that we have an additive Cobb-Douglas framework, whereby each crop takes the same functional
form (i.e. has the same ↵ terms). This assumption is key to the proof.
The household faces the problem:






2 s.t l1 + l2 = LT a1 + a2 = AT
The error terms go away in the case of maximizing the expectation. The constraints indicate that all labour and
must be allocated.
The Lagrangian becomes: L = p1 1l↵1 a1 ↵1 + p2 2l↵2 a
1 ↵
2 +  l(LT   l1   l2) +  A(AT   a1   a2)
The first order conditions are:




1    L = 0




2    L = 0




1    A = 0




2    A = 0
5. @L@ L = LT   l1   l2 = 0
6. @L@ A = AT   a1   a2 = 0
We cannot explicitly solve for our choice variables, but we can demonstrate key relationships between them: we









We note that in the optimal case, from standard microeconomic theory, the marginal revenue from labour allo-
cations to crops 1 and 2 must equal, and the marginal revenue from land allocations to crops 1 and 2 must equal.
As a result, we set FOC 1 equal to FOC 2, andwe set FOC 3 equal to FOC 4. This is equivalent to setting themarginal
revenues equal to each other (because FOC’s 1-4 are marginal revenues excepting the lambda term which drops out
of the analysis in any case when we set FOC’s 1 and 2 equal to each other FOC’s 3 and 4 equal to each other).

















































Now we perform the same analysis on FOC’s 3 and 4 (the FOC’s for the a terms):
We start with FOC 3 = FOC 4:





































































































































So, we have shown that the ratios of allocations must equal, but we need to show that proportion of total allo-
cations equal each other. So we use the definitions of total allocations: l1 + l2 = L2 and a1 + a2 = AT . The proof
from here is quite trivial.






a1(Lt   l1) = l1(AT   a1)
Expanding:
a1LT   a1l1 = l1AT   a1l1












We denote a1 and l1 as a⇤1 and l
⇤
1 because these are efficient solutions. Now, we have proved that under efficient
allocations, the proportion of total land and labour allocated to a crop are equal.
Because this result holds, the term si = liL =
ai









This concludes the proof for why si can be used in the mean variance model while maintaining the Cobb-Douglas
production function for each good.
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B Derivation of Optimal Market Consumption
This appendix derives the optimal consumption levels for goods consumed on the market. To demonstrate this, we
present the utility function using only market consumption and an exogonous income constraint for simplicity. At the




































  1 8 i 2 N (30)




















  1 8 i 2 N (32)
c
⇤
i can be plugged into the utility function to obtain the value function in Equation 9.
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C Proof that HHI Decreases with Income










  1 8 i 2 N (33)
The consumption share of good i is equal to the proportion of good i consumed over total consumption: ci/C
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We want to know if @HHI@I ? 0. The second term is simply a positive constant and can be ignored because it is
irrelevant for determining the sign of the comparative static of HHI with respect to I .
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Getting a common denominator:
(pi
PN
j=1 wj   wi
PN
j=1 pj   wiI
PN
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Notice that the sign of the ”inside” portion of the derivative relies only on the numerator. The denominator is






















































































Assuming that prices and preferences differ across crops, the LHS takes must be less than one. If wi values are
normalized such thatwi >= 18 i, then the LHS is always less than the RHS and the ”inside” of the chain rule derivative
is negative.
To complete the derivation of the comparative static of HHI with respect to I , we note that the ”outside” part of
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This means that as income increases, the concentration of consumption decreases. In other words, dietary diver-
sity increases.
D Derivation of Solution of Imperfect markets Without Risk
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(53)














  1 = 1 (55)
























The comparative statics are consistent with economic theory – an increase in the preference parameterwi or the
production parameter  i leads to an increase in si, while an increase wj or  j for another good j 6= i leads to a
decrease in the allocation to si.
E Derivation of Mean-Variance Solution
For simplicity in this derivation, we denote smi as si for all values of i.







































The FOCs are given by:
@L
@si
= pi i   a(si 2i +
X
j=1,j 6=i
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The FOCs can then be written as the following system of equation:
s = r  10 
s01 = 1
(66)
Solving the first matrix equation:
s =  1r   110  (67)
where  1 is the inverse of the covariance matrix, known as the precision matrix.






Plugging 1  into s, the optimal production shares can be given by:




Notice that when a ! 1 (i.e. the household becomes extremely risk averse), then solution is the result of the





F Correlates of Market Participation: Choosing a Market Access Vari-
able
In Table 6, themeasure that is most positively correlated withmarket participation is the presence of a daily or weekly
market in a village. While log distance to the market (from either household or plots) is significantly correlated with
market participation, the direction of the correlation suggests that household further from markets, participate in
markets more frequently. This relationship runs contrary to theory, and the market access variable should correlated
theoretically and empirically with increased participation. As a result, the presence of anymarket in a village is chosen
(despite not being robust to the inclusion of fixed effects). This exercise underscores the need for careful and better
measurement of market access variables.
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Table 6: Correlates of Market Participation





















































No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observa-
tions 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
Columns 1-10 are estimated using a GLM model using a logistic functional link and binomial distribution.
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G Consumption Diversity and Market Access
Figure 5: Correlates of HDDS: Interaction between ADS and ProducerMarket Participation (95% Confidence Intervals)
Figure 6: Correlates of HDDS: Interaction between SI and Producer Market Participation (95% Confidence Intervals)
Figure 7: Correlates of HDDS: Interaction between ADS and ProducerMarket Participation (95% Confidence Intervals)
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Figure 8: Correlates of HHI: Interaction between SI and Producer Market Participation (95% Confidence Intervals)
Table 7: Correlates of Household Dietary Diversity Score (Market Access)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HDDS HDDS HDDS HDDS HDDS HDDS
Food Crop Count 0.159⇤⇤⇤ 0.112⇤⇤ 0.0777⇤
(0.0500) (0.0466) (0.0453)
Crop HHI -0.555⇤⇤⇤ -0.266 -0.318⇤
(0.206) (0.191) (0.182)
Daily or Weekly
Market = 1 -0.194 0.0722 -0.0393 -0.206 0.0646 -0.0399
(0.156) (0.174) (0.152) (0.155) (0.173) (0.151)




Male HH Head 0.0329 0.0332
(0.138) (0.137)
HH Size 0.0317 0.0365
(0.0250) (0.0251)























Own Mobile Phone 0.477⇤⇤⇤ 0.480⇤⇤⇤
(0.141) (0.141)
District Fixed Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Survey Month Fixed
Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
Columns 1-6 are estimated using a GLM model using a logistic functional link and binomial distribution.
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Table 8: Correlates of Consumption HHI (Market Access)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HHI HHI HHI HHI HHI HHI
Food Crop Count -0.0126⇤⇤ -0.00925⇤ -0.00973⇤⇤
(0.00511) (0.00472) (0.00487)
Crop HHI 0.0267 0.0130 0.00829
(0.0200) (0.0182) (0.0185)
Daily or Weekly
Market = 1 0.0351
⇤ 0.00990 0.0196 0.0373⇤⇤ 0.0103 0.0199
(0.0184) (0.0175) (0.0167) (0.0182) (0.0175) (0.0168)




Male HH Head -0.0176 -0.0174
(0.0139) (0.0139)
HH Size 0.0114⇤⇤⇤ 0.0108⇤⇤⇤
(0.00253) (0.00249)






















Own Mobile Phone -0.0407⇤⇤⇤ -0.0407⇤⇤⇤
(0.0134) (0.0134)
District Fixed Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Survey Month Fixed
Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
Columns 1-6 are estimated using a GLM model using a logistic functional link and binomial distribution.
42
H Anthropometric Measures
Table 9: Correlates of Anthropometric Measures (Market Paricipation)










Wasting = 1 Wasting = 1 Wasting = 1 Stunting = 1 Stunting = 1 Stunting = 1
Food Crop
Count 0.00483 0.00372 -0.00406 -0.00701 -0.0146 -0.0286
⇤⇤⇤ -0.00108 -0.00452 -0.00856
(0.00727) (0.00983) (0.00945) (0.00967) (0.0107) (0.0101) (0.00368) (0.00703) (0.00661)
% of Crops
Sold 0.000737
⇤⇤ 0.000866⇤⇤ 0.000851⇤⇤ 0.000445 0.000283 0.000364 0.000209 0.000207 0.000143
(0.000367) (0.000430) (0.000409) (0.000595) (0.000607) (0.000544) (0.000175) (0.000288) (0.000264)
HH Head






HH Size 0.0294⇤⇤⇤ 0.0615⇤⇤⇤ 0.0103⇤⇤⇤
(0.00364) (0.00575) (0.00347)
Total HH






























Phone -0.0117 -0.0333 0.00973
(0.0211) (0.0286) (0.0169)
District Fixed




No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observa-
tions 1050 875 875 1050 1050 1050 1050 672 672
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
Columns 1-9 are estimated using a Probit model
The numbers of observations in Columns 2, 3, 8, and 9 are lower because the
Probit model predicts some cases perfectly with fixed effects.
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Table 10: Correlates of Anthropometric Measures (Market Paricipation)










Wasting = 1 Wasting = 1 Wasting = 1 Stunting = 1 Stunting = 1 Stunting = 1
Crop HHI -0.0213 -0.0260 -0.0128 -0.0506 -0.0497 -0.0564 -0.0299⇤ -0.0604⇤⇤ -0.0685⇤⇤
(0.0301) (0.0367) (0.0380) (0.0422) (0.0423) (0.0432) (0.0175) (0.0290) (0.0321)
% of Crops
Sold 0.000734
⇤⇤ 0.000875⇤⇤ 0.000897⇤⇤ 0.000578 0.000412 0.000590 0.000262 0.000264 0.000262
(0.000374) (0.000430) (0.000411) (0.000598) (0.000608) (0.000563) (0.000191) (0.000293) (0.000285)
HH Head







































Phone -0.0112 -0.0313 0.0121
(0.0209) (0.0289) (0.0168)
District Fixed




No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observa-
tions 1050 875 875 1050 1050 1050 1050 672 672
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
Columns 1-9 are estimated using a Probit model
The numbers of observations in Columns 2, 3, 8, and 9 are lower because the
Probit model predicts some cases perfectly with fixed effects.
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Figure 9: Correlates of Anthropometric Measures: Interaction between ADS and Producer Market Participation (95%
Confidence Intervals)
Figure 10: Correlates of Anthropometric Measures: Interaction between SI and Producer Market Participation (95%
Confidence Intervals)
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